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Abstract—Given the constant rise in utilizing embedded devices in daily life, side channels remain a challenge to information flow
control and security in such systems. One such important security flaw could be exploited through temperature side-channel attacks,
where heat dissipation and propagation from the processing elements are observed over time in order to deduce security flaws. In our
proposed methodology, DATE: Defense Against TEmperature side-channel attacks, we propose a novel approach of reducing spatial
and temporal thermal gradient, which makes the system more secure against temperature side-channel attacks, and at the same time
increases the reliability of the device in terms of lifespan. In this paper, we have also introduced a new metric,
Thermal-Security-in-Multi-Processors (TSMP), which is capable of quantifying the security against temperature side-channel attacks
on computing systems, and DATE is evaluated to be 139.24% more secure at the most for certain applications than the state-of-the-art,
while reducing thermal cycle by 67.42% at the most.
Index Terms—Lifetime reliability, multiprocessor systems-on-chip (MPSoCs), thermal management, side-channel attack, security,
machine learning, DVFS.
F
1 INTRODUCTION AND MOTIVATION
As embedded computing systems become more and more
ubiquitous, security issues in these and similar systems become
more paramount. These embedded systems have to face hostile
security threats [1]–[4] such as physical, logical/software-based
and side-channel/lateral attacks. Amongst these, side-channel
attack is a popular security threat due to ease of access to
the physical hardware [1]–[3], where attacks are performed
by observing the properties and behavior of the system such
as power consumption, thermal dissipation, electromagnetic
emission, etc.
Comparatively a lot less documented studies are performed
in temperature based side channel attacks [1]–[3] in the em-
bedded computing systems. Due to a rise in the use of hetero-
geneous multi-processors systems-on-chips (MPSoCs) [5], [6]
in the embedded systems and a rise in studies on thermal side
channel attacks [3], [7], [8], it is crucial that side channel attacks
in such platform should be addressed with utmost importance
[8]. Several studies [3], [7], [8] have pointed out processor’s
core temperature could be used to carry out side channel
attacks even when the system has strong spatial and temporal
partitioning of resources such as separate partitioning of cache
memory, bus bandwidth, etc. But all these studies are focused
on general purpose processors (using Complex Instruction Set
Computer (CISC) architecture) and not on embedded multi-
processors (using Reduced Instruction Set Computer (RISC)
architecture), which have different architecture and operat-
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ing signature from the general purpose ones. On the other
hand, we could also see several studies [9], [10] documenting
power/energy consumption for different types of instructions.
Since there is a direct correlation between power consumption
and heat dissipation [11], [12], and armed with the knowledge
of power consumption of each instruction executed on proces-
sors, it is even easier to launch a side channel attacks on these
systems.
In the study [7] thermal covert channels on multi-
processors were exploited by observing the exponential rise
and fall of CPU temperature while executing a CPU intensive
application. In order to verify this behavior on embedded
multi-processors we observed the temperature readings on 4
ARM Cortex A-15 big CPU cores on the Exynos 5422 [13]
system-on-chip (SoC) while almost idle (the system was only
executing background OS processes and the Linux governor
was running ondemand power scheme), which we denote as
basel ine temperature of the CPU cores. In Fig. 1 we could
notice basel ine temperature of ARM Cortex A-15 big CPUs1
in both 2D (Fig. 1.(a)) and 3D (Fig. 1.(b)) plots. The reason
to provide a visual representation of both 2D and 3D plots is
to highlight the spatial as well as temporal thermal gradient
because the 2D representation might not be able to provide a
microscopic view of spatial thermal gradient over time. The X-
axis of the 3D graph represents the temperature, Y-axis of the
graph represents time interval and the Z-axis represents the
frequency of that particular temperature over time. Since the
Odroid XU4 [6] platform, which implements the Exynos 5422
MPSoC, only have temperature sensors on 4 ARM Cortex-A15
1. The graph representing the basel ine temperature readings for dif-
ferent ARM Cortex A-15 big CPUs closely mimicked the oscillatory pattern
that of simple harmonic motion [14].
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Fig. 1: Temperature readings on 4 ARM A-15 big CPU cores
while idle
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Fig. 2: Temperature peaks on 4 ARM A-15 big CPU cores while
executing Blackscholes benchmark
(big) CPU cores, we have only reported on their temperature
behavior.
Based on [7] when we executed the Blackscholes bench-
mark from the PARSEC benchmark suits [15] with default
Linux ondemand governor on the Exynos 5422 SoC, we could
notice spikes in temperature at certain intervals along with
a high frequency in thermal cycles (see Fig. 2). In Fig. 2, we
noticed that the temporal and spatial thermal gradient on the
CPU cores varies a lot during the execution period. When
we compared the thermal behavior of the CPUs during the
execution of Blackscholes and basel ine temperature from
our earlier observation, it became evident that heat dissipation
from multiple processors could in fact lead to thermal covert
channels and hence leading to temperature side-channel at-
tacks.
Most of the relevant published works [3], [7], [8], [11],
[12], [16]–[18] in temperature side-channel attacks focus on
various different element of pursuing such attack or protect
from it. However, none of them has evaluated security against
temperature side-channel attack as a cumulative entity. The
main reason is that the definition of overall security of a device
against temperature side-channel attacks is missing. Therefore,
in this paper, we define a metric coined as Thermal-Security-
in-Multi-Processors (TSMP ), which indicates the cumulative
security against such side-channel attacks.
The main objective of this paper is to reduce the value
of TSMP for any executing application/task in order to im-
prove the security of the MPSoC from temperature based side-
channel attacks. In order to overcome the pressing issue of
temperature side-channel attacks, we propose a novel ther-
mal management methodology on Dynamic Voltage Frequency
Scaling (DVFS) [5], [19]–[21] enabled MPSoCs in an embed-
ded device, and to the best of our knowledge it is the first
documented methodology on securing against thermal side-
channel attacks on DVFS. DVFS helps to reduce the energy
consumption by executing the workload over extra time at a
lower voltage and frequency, which could be accounted for
reduced power consumption. We have coined our proposed
methodology as DATE , Defense Against TEmperature side-
channel attacks. Another important advantage of our proposed
methodology is that due to the overall reduction of operating
temperature the reliability of the device in terms of lifespan
also increases. We have also performed temperature based
side-channel attack on the latest Samsung Galaxy Note9 [22]
(utilizing Exynos 9810 MPSoC [23]) phablet to show the efficacy
of DATE by using Covolutional Neural Network (CNN) [24]–
[26] based Deep Learning [27] to analyze thermal behavior and
predict which password is being used for cryptographic opera-
tion. In summary, this paper makes the following contributions.
1) A new metric to quantify the probability of the embed-
ded device prone to temperature based side-channel
attacks.
2) A novel thermal management scheme specific to exe-
cuting application to secure against temperature side-
channel attacks and improve reliability of the device in
terms of lifespan.
3) Motivational case study with a real attack on real
hardware platforms such as Galaxy Note9 [22] and
Odroid-XU4 [6].
4) Implementation and validation of our proposed
methodology on the real hardware platform (Odroid-
XU4) using several benchmark applications.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Sec. 2 describes
the problem definition and introduces some terms useful to un-
derstand the proposed methodology. In Sec. 3, we discuss the
proposed methodology along with associated block diagram
and algorithms. Sec. 5 explores the different experimentation
and evaluation performed to prove the efficacy of our proposed
methodology while discussing the future scope of this research.
In Sec. 6, we explore the related works on this topic and finally,
Sec. 7 concludes the paper.
2 PROBLEM FORMULATION
If we assume that there are n number of processing elements
(p) in the MPSoC and P represent the set of all the processing
elements then we get Eq. 1
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Fig. 3: Observations of thermal behavior of four ARM Cortex A15 (big) CPUs on Odroid XU4 while performing RSA encryption
and decryption
P = {p1,p2, ....pn} (1)
Now, if we consider bi be the baseline temperature for
a processing element pi , where baseline temperature is the
temperature of the corresponding processing element i on
the MPSoC while idle, and ti be the maximum operating
temperature of pi while executing a task T , then we get the
formula for Baseline Temperature Difference (BTD) for pi for
task T as Eq. 2.
BTDpi =
ØØti °bi ØØ (2)
If S(BTD) be the set of all Baseline Temperature Difference
for all processing elements for a particular task T in the system
such that S(BTD) = { BTDp1 ,BTDp2 , ....BTDpn , }, then from
the Eq. 2 we can deduce the equation for Baseline Maximum
Thermal Deviation (ø) as follows:
8pi 2 P : ø=max( S(BTD) ) (3)
Let’s assume that the temperature difference (di ) between
any two processing elements such as tk and t j be the average
operating temperature of pk and p j , respectively, while execut-
ing a task T , then we get the following equation:
di =
ØØØt j ° tk ØØØ (4)
Now, for all the processing elements P we will achieve
n!
2(n°2)! combinations of temperature difference between any
two processing elements in the system. If we consider Spatial
Processing Temperature Differences (SPTD) be a set containing
all the combinations ( n!2(n°2)! ) of temperature differences be-
tween the processing elements while executing a task T then
we could derive the formula for Spatial Maximum Thermal
Deviation (!) as follows:
8pi 2 P : !=max( SPTD ) (5)
For quantifying the security of a MPSoC against temper-
ature side-channel attacks, we can derive an equation from
the values of ø, ! and the frequency of thermal cycle during
execution of task T (µ). The reason to choose these three
variables (ø, ! & µ) is that from our experiments (described in
Section 2.1) we observed that these three variables are directly
correlated to thermal behavior of the processing elements. We
define the security against temperature side-channel attacks as
Thermal-Security-in-Multi-Processors (TSMP ), shown in Eq. 6.
TSMP = 1
ø+!+µ
ØØØ 0< TSMP < 1 (6)
In Eq. 6 if the value is closer to 1 then it means that the
device is more secure against temperature side-channel attacks,
whereas, as value closer to 0 means that the device is more
prone to security threats related to temperature side-channel.
We also have to keep in mind that (ø+!+µ) can never be 1
or 0 in reality nor the value of ø, ! and µ could be decimal as
per our platform. Now, from the Eq. 6 in order to improve the
security of a device against temperature side-channel attacks
our main objective is to keep the total value of (ø+!+µ) as
low as possible such that the value of TSMP is as close to 1 as
possible. Therefore, we could define our problem as follows.
Given: An application and a MPSoC platform with DVFS sup-
port.
Find: Maximum value of TSMP .
Subject to: Meeting performance requirement of each applica-
tion within available MPSoC resources.
2.1 Importance of ø, ! and µ in TSMP metric
To understand the key factors that are related to establishing
thermal side-channel attacks on a MPSoC such as Odroid XU4
[6] , we performed RSA encryption and decryption several times
on the platform and observed the thermal behavior of the four
ARM A15 (big) CPU cores. On the Odroid XU4, the 8 CPU
cores (big.LITTLE) are denoted as CPU 0, CPU 1 to CPU 7,
where CPU 0 to CPU 3 are ARM A7 (LITTLE) cores and CPU
4 to CPU 7 are ARM A15 (big) cores. We are only performing
the encryption and decryption on one of the big CPU cores
(CPU 6) so that we could observe the thermal behavior on
the other neighboring idle CPU cores (CPU 4, 5 and 7). Fig. 3
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shows one such instance of the experiments performed where
we are observing the thermal behavior 3 seconds before the
RSA encryption and decryption is executed till 2 seconds after
the execution completes. In Fig. 3 we have highlighted three
important observations (see Observation 1, 2 and 3 in the
figure), which were common in all the experiments performed.
On the Y axis of Fig. 3 we could notice the temperature in
degree centigrades of each of the A15 CPU cores, colour coded
separately for individual CPU cores, and the X axis represents
the time interval with 100 milliseconds gap between each
interval. In Observation 1 we could notice that the temperature
drastically increases on CPU 6 within 3 seconds and the most
important thing to notice here is that not only the temperature
of CPU 6 increases but at the same time temperature of all
neighboring A15 CPU cores (CPU 4, 5 and 7) also increase.
The reason for this phenomenon is due to heat dissipation and
propagation in the lateral direction. In Observation 2 we can
notice that once the encryption and decryption complete on
CPU 6 the temperature plummets not only on that core but
also on the neighboring cores. Although in this observation it
could be noticed that temperature plummets over 2 seconds
and not instantaneously. As stated by Masti et al. [7], thermal
covert channels can be exploited by observing the exponential
rise and fall of CPU temperature. Therefore, Observation 1 and
Observation 2 proves the theory proposed in the study [7].
More importantly, Baseline Maximum Thermal Deviation (ø)
and Spatial Maximum Thermal Deviation (!) directly reflect
the issues mentioned in Observation 1 and 2 of Fig. 3.
More interestingly, if we notice Observation 3 (3.A and 3.B)
we can find that whenever there is a spike in temperature on
CPU 6 there is also a spike in temperature on the neighboring
CPUs due to heat propagation. Thus proving that when the
temperature of one CPU core increases, due to heat propaga-
tion from that CPU core to the nearby CPU cores the thermal
behavior of these adjacent cores are also affected. Therefore,
potentially opening up a vulnerability if one such adjacent CPU
core could be used to establish a temperature side-channel
attack.
Since, ø and ! reflect the temporal as well as spatial thermal
gradient difference of the CPU cores while they are executing
a task (or set of tasks) and being idle, the aforementioned
variables are very important in understanding the vulnerability
of MPSoCs against temperature side-channel attack. Whereas,
the frequency of thermal cycle during execution of a task (or set
of tasks) (µ) directly reflects the phenomenon of Observation
3 (3.A and 3.B) and hence µ also plays an important role
in deducing vulnerability related to temperature side-channel
attack. Therefore, it is crucial to define the Thermal-Security-
in-Multi-Processors (TSMP) metric incorporating ø, ! and µ.
3 PROPOSED METHODOLOGY: DATE
3.1 Overview of DATE
An overview of the proposed DATE methodology is illustrated
in Fig. 4. It has some offline and online steps. During offline
profiling computed results for various applications are used
to identify the appropriate temperature (tAppi ) and frequency
( fAppi ) such that a cumulative least value for (ø+!+µ) (see
Eq. 6) is achieved. Since for each application we have to
explore all the possible frequency values along with appropriate
temperature and performance threshold such that TSMP is
maximum for Appi , we do the profiling offline as part of
the design space exploration. Once we have found out the
best possible frequency and temperature which yields the least
value for (ø+!+ µ), we save the frequency and temperature
values along with some other parameters. These values are
later used during the online step where we set the frequency
and temperature threshold of the system to these saved values.
In DATE, we call the offline step as Learning Module whereas,
the online step is called as Decision Module. Since, operating
temperature of the device directly affects the reliability of such
device in terms of lifespan, hence, DATE methodology affects
the reliability of the device in a positive manner (more details
in Sec. 5.3).
App1 Appn
Profiling on Processing 
Elements to find least 
value of (?+? +?)
Save the appropriate 
values of tthreshold, fAppi, ?
and ?
Profile Data
Set the temperature 
and frequency based 
on tthreshold, fAppi, ?
and ? when Appi is 
executed
Learning Module (Offline) Decision Module (Online)
tthreshold, fAppi, 
?
and ?
Fig. 4: Proposed Methodology: DATE
3.2 Learning Module
The complete algorithm explaining the working of Learning
Module is provided in Algo. 1.
In the study [11] through experiments on real devices, it
was noticed that on MPSoCs power and temperature follow
a relationship of quadratic function. On the other hand, in
DVFS enabled MPSoCs dynamic power and frequency fol-
low a quadratic relationship due to the power consumption
(P / V 2f ) being directly affected by the operating frequency
and voltage [28]–[30]. However, to make our approach fast
during run time (Decision Module) we assume that frequency
and temperature follows a linear relationship represented by
Eq. 7.
ti =Æ£ fi +Ø (7)
In Eq. 7, fi is the operating frequency at time instance i , ti is
the operating temperature at the same time instance, Æ is the
relationship variable and Ø is the intercept variable.
Now, we first set a performance deadline (for our case we
choose execution time deadline for each application) and then
start executing Appi and vary the frequency as well as the tem-
perature threshold of the system to observe the performance.
Here, the temperature threshold is the operating thermal cap,
which can not be surpassed by the system during the execution
of the application. If we consider tavai lable is the set of all
available operating temperature (tavai lable = {t1, t2, ...ti }) of the
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system, which will be used as the thermal cap during the
profiling, then for each instance of operating temperature
(tavai lablei ) from tavai lable we monitor the performance while
setting the temperature threshold to tavai lablei .
While monitoring performance the frequency of the PEs
is reduced by one frequency scaling step (we start at the
maximum frequency and this is denoted as ReduceFrequen-
cyByOneStep() in Algo. 1) and returns the reduced frequency
instance ( fi ). We monitor the temperature of each PE (denoted
as MeasureTemperatureValue() in Algo. 1) and returns the set
of temperature values of all the PEs during the profiling. If
the performance deadline for the application is met then
the maximum value among the set of temperature is used
as the temperature threshold. By this approach we leverage
DVFS capability of the system and modify the frequency till
the performance constraint is met and try to achieve least
possible values for ø , ! and µ. After we have found the ap-
propriate value of system’s temperature threshold/cap (tAppi )
and frequency ( fAppi ) we note the value of Æ and Ø (from
Eq. 7). For Appi the relationship variable and intercept are
denoted by ÆAppi and ØAppi respectively. For each profiled
application we only save the values of maximum operating
temperature threshold/cap (tthresholdAppi ) which should not be
surpassed during the execution of Appi , operating frequency
( fAppi ), ÆAppi , ØAppi and baseline temperature (bAppi ) during
the profiling period on the memory to be used in the Decision
Module. Here, the baseline temperature (bAppi ) for the profiling
application is the same baseline temperature, which is recorded
before and after the application is executed such that bAppi = bi
in Eq. 2. In practice, we actually save the value of bAppi for
each processing element in the system as a set of baseline
temperatures (BAppi ).
Algorithm 1: Learning Module Execution
Input:
1. Per fmax : performance deadline for an application
instance Appi
2. Bi : a set of baseline temperature (bi ) for each processing
element (PE)
Output: < tthresholdAppi , fAppi ,ÆAppi ,ØAppi ,BAppi >
Initialize: ø+!+µ =1;
foreach tavai lablei in tavai lable of the system do
tthresholdAppi = tavai lablei ;
%Per fAppi is the current performance of the
application%
while Per fAppi ∑ Per fmax do
fi = ReduceFrequencyByOneStep(); (see Sec. 3.2)
Ti = MeasureTemperatureValue();
øi = CalculateTau(Bi ); %see Eq. 3%
!i = CalculateOmega(Bi ); %see Eq. 5%
µi = CalculateTheta(); %see Sec. 3.2%
if (øi +!i +µi )< (ø+!+µ) then
ø = øi , ! = !i , µ = µi ;
tthresholdAppi =max(Ti ), fAppi = fi ;
<ÆAppi ,ØAppi > =
CalculateAlphaBeta(tthresholdAppi , fAppi ); (Sec. 3.2)
return < tthresholdAppi , fAppi ,ÆAppi ,ØAppi ,BAppi =Bi >;
3.3 Decision Module
The algorithm for Decision Module is provided in Algo. 2.
In the Decision Module, a software agent, which we call as
DATE as well, first loads the baseline temperature (bAppi ) for
the profiled application and compares the current temperature
with baseline temperature during this time instance (bnow ).
The set of baseline temperatures for all PEs is Bnow . Since
baseline temperature can vary depending on the surrounding
and other unforeseen circumstances, it is important DATE is
aware of the difference between the baseline temperature when
the application was profiled and the baseline temperature for
the time period when the Decision Module of DATE acts and
could be represented as bdi f f = bAppi °bnow . For set of PEs it
is Bdi f f .
Now, if we assume that the value of Æ and Ø remains almost
same (subject to some obvious deviation and we refer to it as
error) then from Eq. 7 we can get the equation (see Eq. 8) that
could define the relationship between two different operating
temperature and their associated frequencies.
f2 = (t2° t1)
Æ
+ f1 (8)
We can modify the Eq. 8 to reflect the governing equation
(see Eq. 9) to decide the operating temperature threshold and
associated frequency by DATE.
fdesi red =
(tdesi red threshold ° tthresholdAppi )
Æ
+ fAppi (9)
If the value of bdi f f is negative then DATE reduces the
operating frequency by evaluating the new operating fre-
quency value while considering that bdi f f = (tdesi red threshold°
tthresholdAppi ) in Eq. 9. But if the value of bdi f f is positive then
Eq. 9 could be modified as follows:
fdesi red =
(tdesi red threshold +bdi f f )
Æ
+ fAppi (10)
If the value of calculated fdesi red is more than the available
frequency of the CPU cores then DATE do not modify the
operating frequency, thus, fdesr ied = fAppi but modifies the
operating temperature threshold as tdesi red threshold = bdi f f +
tthresholdAppi . While executing the application, if the operating
temperature of the CPU cores tries to go higher than the
operating temperature threshold (tdesi red threshold ) then DATE
drops the frequency ( fdesi red ) to next frequency scaling level,
which is again evaluated from the Eq. 8 by assuming that the
operating temperature of the system needs to be reduced by
1° Centigrade. The governing equation to achieve this is as
follows:
fdesi red = fnow ° 1
Æ
where, tdesi red ° tnow =°1
(11)
4 CASE STUDY: PERFORMING A REAL ATTACK ON
GALAXY NOTE9 AND ODROID XU4
We performed a live attack on the Galaxy Note9 mobile device,
which is one of the top rated smart phones of 2018 and 2019
[31], [32]. To prove the scalability and affect of the attack
we also executed the same methodology on Odroid XU4. We
executed a program sitting on one of the LITTLE cores on
the device, while snooping the thermal behavior of the big
core cluster during several encryption (AES-256 [33]) operations
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Algorithm 2: Decision Module Execution
Input:
< tthresholdAppi , fAppi , ÆAppi , ØAppi , BAppi > & Bnow
Bdi f f = CalculateBaselineDiff(BAppi , Bnow ); (Sec. 3.3)
foreach PE (Pi ) in the set of PEs (P) on the system do
bPEdi f f = GetBaselineDiff(Bdi f f , Pi ); %Function to get
the baseline difference (bPEdi f f ) for Pi
if bPEdi f f > 0 then
fdesi red = CalculateDesiredFrequency(bPEdi f f );
(using Eq. 10)
SetFrequencyOfPE( fdesi red ); %Function to set the
frequency of the PE with the value of fdesi red%
SetTempThres(tthresholdAppi ); %Function to set the
maximum thermal cap of the PE as tthresholdAppi %
else
fdesi red = CalculateDesiredFrequency(bPEdi f f );
(using Eq. 11)
% fPEmax is the maximum frequency of the PE%
if fdesi red > fPEmax then
fdesi red = fAppi ; SetFrequencyOfPE( fdesi red );
tdesi red threshold = bPEdi f f + tthresholdAppi ;
(see Eq. 10 and Eq. 11)
SetTempThres(tdesi red threshold );
else
SetFrequencyOfPE( fdesi red );
SetTempThres(tthresholdAppi );
of a text file with 4 of the most common passwords used
by the users. The main motive of this attack is to evaluate
the vulnerability of the latest smart-phone against thermal
side-channel attack. More details on the device, experimental
setup and evaluation of the attack is provided in the following
subsections.
4.1 Hardware & Software Infrastructure of Note9
Nowadays heterogeneous MPSoCs consist of different types
of cores, either having the same or different instruction set
architecture (ISA). Moreover, the number of cores of each type
of ISA can vary based on MPSoCs and are usually clustered
if the types of cores are similar. For this research, we have
chosen an Asymmetric Multi-processors (AMPs) system-on-
chip (AMPSoC), which has clustered cores on the system. We
chose to execute a real attack on Galaxy Note9 [22], which is the
latest mobile device from Samsung and utilizes the Exynos 9810
MPSoC [23]. The block diagram of Exynos 9810 is provided in
Fig. 5. Exynos 9810 has two CPU clusters, one for big CPU cores
consisting of 4 Mongoose 3 CPU cores, and the other cluster for
LITTLE CPU cores consisting of 4 Cortex A-55 CPU cores. The
Mongoose 3 CPU cores allow cluster wise DVFS and has 18
frequency scaling levels ranging from 650 MHz to 2704 MHz
(2704 MHz, 2652 MHz, 2496 MHz, 2314 MHz, 2106 MHz, 2002
MHz, 1924 MHz, 1794 MHz, 1690 MHz, 1586 MHz, 1469 MHz,
1261 MHz, 1170 MHz, 1066 MHz, 962 MHz, 858 MHz, 741 MHz,
650 MHz). Whereas, the LITTLE Cortex-A55 CPU cores has 10
frequency scaling levels ranging from 455 MHz to 1794 MHz
(1794 MHz, 1690 MHz, 1456 MHz, 1248 MHz, 1053 MHz, 949
MHz, 832 MHz, 715 MHz, 598 MHz, and 455 MHz).
The Galaxy Note9 was running on Android 9 (Pie) [34]
OS utilizing Linux kernel version 4.9.59, which has only one
governor named schedutil based on Energy Aware Scheduling
Fig. 5: Exynos 9810 [23] MPSoC block diagram highlighting
major components
(EAS) [35]. The Galaxy Note9 is only utilized for this case
study to prove the threat of thermal side channel attack in real
popular commercial device.
4.2 Hardware & Software Infrastructure of Odroid XU4
We also chose Odroid XU4 board [6] (see Fig. 6) to execute the
attack in order to verify the affect and scalability of thermal
side-channel exploitation on a device other than Galaxy Note9.
We also used Odroid XU4 for the rest of the experimenta-
tion and validation because of more availability of software
execution support since Galaxy Note9 is vendor locked to
only modify certain portions of the Android OS. Odroid XU4
employs the Samsung Exynos 5422 [13] MPSoC. As mentioned
earlier Exynos 5422 MPSoC contains clusters of big and LITTLE
cores. This MPSoC provides DVFS feature per cluster, where the
big core cluster has 19 frequency scaling levels, ranging from
200 MHz to 2000 MHz with each step of 100 MHz and the
LITTLE cluster has 13 frequency scaling levels, ranging from
200 MHz to 1400 MHz, with each step of 100 MHz.
The Odroid XU4 was running on UbuntuMate version
14.04 (Linux Odroid Kernel: 3.10.105), which was running on
performance governor.
4.3 Dataset and CNN Model
To perform the attack we chose 4 of the 25 most common pass-
words of 2017 and 2018 [36], [37] as surveyed by the Internet
security firm SplashData. The 4 common passwords used by
the user, which are chosen for our attack, are 123456, passw0rd,
111111 and football. We executed AES-256 [33] encryption on
a text file using the aforementioned passwords 500 times for
each password. The reason to choose AES-256 is because of its
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Fig. 6: Odroid XU4 [6] MPSoC block diagram highlighting major components
popularity. The encryption operations were performed on the
4 Mongoose 3 big CPU cores (big CPU cluster) while one of the
LITTLE cores snoop the operating temperature data of the big
CPU cluster. This is due to the fact that only one thermal sensor
is present on the big CPU cluster of Galaxy Note9 rather than
individually placed on each big CPU core. After the temperature
data for each password were collected, we transformed the data
points into a graphical representation in order to be fed to a
pre-trained CNN [38] for training and classification purposes.
Since on the Odroid XU4 thermal sensors are individually
placed on each big CPU cores, we chose to only record the
thermal behavior of one of the big CPUs (CPU 7) for this
experimental attack.
We chose ResNet50 CNN [26] as our network model, which
could be used to train our graphical thermal data using Transfer
Learning [38]. Since, CNN based Deep Learning usually re-
quires a lot of training data in order to be used successfully
for classification purposes, the network models are trained on
large dataset such as ImageNet [39], consisting of millions of
images, and then the weights and parameters of the model are
saved and used later to train for a specific target application.
This way of training is called transfer learning and we have used
ResNet 50, which is pre-trained on ImageNet. Since, ResNet50 is
pre-trained on ImageNet and has the last fully connected layer
to classify 1000 different classes/labels from the ImageNet, we
had to modify the last fully connected layer to suit our target
application.
Since, we have 4 passwords as the classes/labels to classify,
we removed the last fully connected layer, which was pre-
trained on ImageNet, to cater for only 4 labels instead. We
have also added a new fully connected layer (called Dense in
Fig. 7), dropout regularization (called Dropout in Fig. 7) and a
softmax function along with a classifier (called PREDICTIONS
in Fig. 7) to only predict for 4 passwords (labels). In Fig. 7 we
have shown the modified fully connected layer along with the
custom classifier used in our ResNet50 CNN model. Here, the
dropout regularization is used for better generalization and the
softmax function is used for probability distribution for the 4
labels/classes. In Fig. 8, we show the graphical representation
of the thermal behavior for each password label, which is fed
Fig. 7: Architecture of ResNet50 CNN model with modified last
fully connected layer used in password classification
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(a) 123456 (b) 111111
(c) passw0rd (d) football
Fig. 8: Graphical representation of thermal behavior (time interval vs temperature in °C) of encryption operation using the
following passwords: 111111, 123456, passw0rd & football
to the ResNet50 CNN model for training and classification
purpose.
From the 500 graphical data for each password label, we
separated 100 graphical data for cross-validation testing pur-
pose. Whereas, 75% of the remaining 400 graphical data for
each password label were used for training and rest of the 25%
is used for validation during the training period. Validation data
is used to provide an unbiased evaluation of a model fit on the
training dataset while tuning hyperparameters of the model.
Code availability: Program codes to implement the at-
tack and generate the dataset could be accessed from ##
Codewillbeprovideduponacceptance##.
4.4 Experimental Results
After training the ResNet50 model with the training and valida-
tion dataset from Note9, the total prediction accuracy achieved
is 36.50%. When we used 400 graphical data (100 data from
each password label) for cross-validation to evaluate the accu-
racy of the trained ResNet50 CNN in predicting the password
being used for encryption operation, the CNN could predict
146 instances correctly and achieving a prediction accuracy of
36.50%. Whereas, when we implemented DATE on the system
to improve the security against thermal side-channel on Note9
and performed the same training methodology with the CNN,
the prediction accuracy achieved by the CNN model after the
training is 26.75%. When we used the 400 graphical data for
cross-validation the CNN was only able to successfully predict
25.25 % (101 out of 400 data). Hence, using DATE to secure
the system against thermal side-channel attack such as the one
performed in this section, we are able to achieve 9.75% (for
training process) and 11.25% (for cross-validation) increase in
security.
When we performed the same training on the thermal data
collected from Odroid XU4, the CNN achieved a training pre-
diction accuracy of 56.75% when DATE was not implemented
on the system. The CNN was also able to predict 52% of the
400 graphical data (208 out of 400) during the cross-validation.
After we implemented DATE on the Odroid XU4 the training
prediction accuracy achieved by the CNN is 26.75% and was
able to predict 29.5% of the 400 data (118 out of 400) during
cross-validation. Therefore, using DATE we are able to achieve
an increase in security against thermal side-channel by 30%
during training period and an increase in security by 22.5%
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during cross-validation.
In order to determine whether our CNN is classifying the
thermal data based on the features of the thermal peaks, we uti-
lized Gradient-weighted Class Activation Mapping (Grad-CAM)
[40] to visualize in which areas of the graphical data the CNN
was focusing on to predict which password is being used for
encryption process. Grad-CAM methodology uses the gradient
of the target classes flowing into the last convolutional layer to
produce a coarse localization map highlighting the important
regions in the image (graphical data) for predicting the class
label. Fig. 9 shows the thermal graphical data generated while
encrypting the plain text using 111111 as password (Fig. 9.(a))
and the subsequent localization mapping created from the last
convolutional layer (Fig. 9.(b)) and then portraying the region
of interest as thermal map on the original image (Fig. 9.(c)).
Fig. 10, 11 and 12 consequently show the Grad-CAM generated
for thermal behavior of the big CPU for individual password’s
(123456, football and passw0rd) encryption process. From the
Grad-cam representation it is evident that our CNN is actually
looking at certain thermal peaks to determine which password
might have been used for encryption and hence, predict the
label accordingly.
(a) (b) (c)
Fig. 9: Focus area of ResNet50 network on a representative
graph of password: 111111
(a) (b) (c)
Fig. 10: Focus area of ResNet50 network on a representative
graph of password: 123456
(a) (b) (c)
Fig. 11: Focus area of ResNet50 network on a representative
graph of password: Football
(a) (b) (c)
Fig. 12: Focus area of ResNet50 network on a representative
graph of password: passw0rd
5 EXPERIMENTAL AND EVALUATION RESULTS
5.1 Hardware & Software Setup for Experiments
Odroid XU4 could be utilized to run on both Android and Linux
operating systems, and hence, we chose to perform most of
our experiments on Odroid XU4 running on Linux OS. Further,
since Linux is more versatile OS than Android and provides
the ability to execute several established benhcmark suits such
as PARSEC [15] unlike Android, we chose to use Linux for the
experimentations provided in this section to show the efficacy
and scalability of DATE.
For multi-core systems, multi-threaded applications are
heavily used in recent times to represent workloads as they
could leverage concurrency and parallel processing. Examples
of such applications are available in several benchmarks such
as PARSEC [15]. For our experiments we have tried several
applications from the PARSEC benchmark such as Streamclus-
ter, Blackscholes, Facesim etc. but to evaluate the effectiveness
of our DATE mechanism we chose Blackscholes and Stream-
clsuter with nati ve option because it closely represented a
real-world mixed (compute and memory intensive) workload
application and the execution period was long enough to
observe the thermal behavior in the system. We also evaluated
our approach for other real-world workload such as playing
a Youtube video on the Chromium browser and RSA [41]
encryption and decryption algorithm for 512, 1024, 2048 and
4096 bits. We have run all our experiments on UbuntuMate
version 14.04 (Linux Odroid Kernel: 3.10.105).
5.2 Experimental Results
In Fig. 13, 14 and 15 we can see step by step evaluation of
Baseline Maximum Thermal Deviation (ø), Spatial Maximum
Thermal Deviation (!) and frequency of thermal cycle (µ) dur-
ing execution of the application for different applications using
DATE. In Fig. 13 Base T. represents the baseline temperature
for different ARM Cortex A-15 CPUs.
Table 1 shows TSMP values for different applications when
various resource management methodologies are employed. .
We evaluated DATE against ondemand and performance gov-
ernor of Linux and the state-of-the-art methodology proposed
by Basireddy et al. [5]. In [5], the researchers have proposed
a workload management system, which classifies workloads
of the executing applications based on Memory Reads Per
Instruction (MRPI) metric and manages DVFS levels of cores
based on it.
RSA encryption and decryption was performed for 512,
1024, 2048, 4096 bits for 10 secs for each types. Based on the
TSMP values in Table 1 DATE is 4.30% more secure for RSA
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TABLE 1: TSMP values for different methodologies
App OnDemand Performance MRPI DATE
Blackscholes 0.001968 0.001124 0.001792 0.003496
Streamcluster 0.000479 0.000450 0.000846 0.001146
RSA 0.001811 0.002439 0.001912 0.002544
Youtube 0.001661 0.002840 0.002906 0.003012
TABLE 2: Thermal cycle reduction comparison with DATE
App OnDemand Performance MRPI
Blackscholes 40.57% 67.42% 46.96%
Streamcluster 59.59% 62.21% 28.45%
RSA 29.34% -2.91% 23.54%
Youtube 48.15% 2.76% 1.06%
encryption and decryption than the Linux Performance Gover-
nor. Whereas, DATE is 139.24% more secure for Streamcluster
benchmark against temperature based side-channel attacks
than the Linux Performance Governor. DATE is also 35.46%
more secure than MRPI [5] for the Streamcluster benchmark.
Fig. 17 graphically shows the temperature peaks achieved
for the Blackscholes application using DATE, which closely
resonates with baseline temperature (see Fig. 1). In comparison,
Fig. 16 highlights the temperature peaks achieved for the
Blackscholes application while executing on ondemand and
performance governors of Linux. From the figures (Fig. 16 and
Fig. 17) it is also very evident that DATE is able to achieve
the reduction in spatial thermal gradient as well as temporal
thermal gradient while the overall operating temperature of the
CPUs is also reduced at the same time (also see the histogram
comparison in Fig. 18).
Note: For data dependent applications over a network such as
playing a video on Youtube in Chromium browser, it was still
difficult to reduce the Spati al Themal Deviation due to data
dependencies over the Internet or due to workload imbalance
between the CPU cores.
5.3 Effect on Device Reliability
Thermal gradient (spatial and temporal) and thermal cycling
[42] play important role in the reliability of the system in terms
of lifespan. The rate of temperature changes on the system
affects the lifespan of the device over time due to degrada-
tion in the structural integrity and chemical property. More
importantly, thermal cycle reduces the whole systems MTTF
(Mean-time-to-failure) as the amplitude and/or frequency of
thermal cycles increase. The number of the thermal cycles
(NTC (i )) that can result in the occurrence of failure due to the
ith thermal cycle can be deduced from the modified Coffin-
Manson equation (see Eq. 12) mentioned in [43].
NTC (i )= ATC (±Ti °Tth)°bexp( EaTCTmaxi
) (12)
In Eq. 12, ±Ti represents the maximum thermal amplitude
change of the ith thermal cycle, Tth is the threshold temper-
ature of the component/device at which inelastic deformation
begins, ATC is an empirically determined constant [43], b is
the Coffin-Manson exponent constant, EaTC is the activation
energy and Tmaxi is the maximum temperature in the i
th
thermal cycle. Therefore, from Eq. 12 we can deduce the MTTF
(MTTFTC ) [44] related to thermal cycle (NTC ) as follows:
MTTFTC =
NTC
Pn
i=0 ti
n
(13)
In Eq. 13, ti is the temperature of the component/device
at ith thermal cycle, and n is the total number (frequency) of
thermal cycle. Since, we focused most of the experiments on
the Odroid XU4 MPSoC, and if we assume that the number
of the thermal cycles (NTC ) that can result in the occurrence
of failure due to the ith thermal cycle is same for the same
device platform, then we can easily evaluate the MTTFTC for
each executing application on individual thermal management
methodologies. Now, if we take the example of Blackscholes
application being executed on the MPSoC using Linux’s onde-
mand governor and assume that ti is the baseline maximum
thermal deviation i.e. ti = ø since baseline temperature is the
same during all the experiments performed during the time
of experimentation, then from Fig. 13 and Fig. 15 we could
notice that ti (ø) is 20 and n (frequency of thermal cycle) is
456. Hence, putting the value of ti and n in Eq. 13, we get the
value of MTTFTC as
NTC£9140
456 . Now, if we consider the DATE
methodology, where Blackscholes is executed on the Odroid
XU4 using DATE, ti is 7 (see Fig. 13) and n is 271 (see Fig. 15),
then we get the value of MTTFTC as
NTC£1904
271 . Therefore, com-
paring theMTTFTC of executing Blackscholes using the Linux’s
ondemand governor and the DATE, the DATE methodology is
2.85 (approx.) (' NTC£9140456 /NTC£1904271 ) times more reliable and
improve the lifespan of the device over time.
5.4 Discussion and Future Direction
For applications with data dependencies over the Internet such
as Youtube or applications with workload imbalance between
the CPU cores, a possible solution to reduce the Spatial Themal
Deviation is to add noise using software/algorithmic imple-
mentation to the temperature variance such that it becomes
very difficult to understand the pattern of execution or data be-
ing processed on the CPU cores. Here, noise could be regarded
as another random execution of secondary tasks in order to
keep the CPU temperature high so that temperature dissipated
due to execution of the current task could be masked. The main
challenge in using such a solution is that to predict when to add
the noise in order to mask thermal dissipation of the currently
executing task properly.
6 RELATED WORK
We have also chosen the state-of-the-art approaches [16]–
[18], which is closely related to our study and address the
temperature side-channel attacks on general purpose multi-
processor/core devices but not on embedded platforms, and
compared the methodologies with the DATE methodology. In
the study by Gu et al. [16], (referred to as 3D-TASCS), the
scholars have proposed a thermal-aware hardware functional
unit that introduces noise to mask activity of encryption and
decryption in order to secure against temperature based side-
channel attack. Whereas, in the study by Long et al. [17],
the researchers have proposed an approach to apply multiple
transmitter to one receiver by generating noise to mask temper-
ature behavior on the main transmitter and also establishing a
new communication protocol between the transmitter and re-
ceiver. In [17], a transmitter is the CPU core, which is executing
the main task or set of tasks such as encryption/decryption,
THIS IS A PREPRINT VERSION SUBMITTED TO IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON COMPUTERS. 11
BaƐe͘ T͘ OŶDeŵaŶd PeƌfŽƌŵaŶce MRPI DATE OŶDeŵaŶd PeƌfŽƌŵaŶce MRPI DATE OŶDeŵaŶd PeƌfŽƌŵaŶce MRPI DATE OŶDeŵaŶd PeƌfŽƌŵaŶce MRPI DATE
CPU ϰ ϲ1 76 7ϴ 76 6ϴ ϵ5 ϵ5 ϵ0 ϵ0 ϴ3 ϴ6 ϴ4 74 ϵ1 ϵ0 ϵ1 ϴ4
CPU ϱ ϲϰ 75 75 76 65 ϴϴ ϵ2 ϵ3 ϴ6 7ϴ 75 ϴ4 ϴ2 ϴ7 ϴ6 ϴ6 ϴ0
CPU ϲ ϲϴ ϴ4 ϴ5 ϴ4 72 ϵ6 ϵ5 ϵ6 ϵ0 ϴ6 ϴ6 77 ϴ2 ϵ6 ϵ0 ϵ5 ϵ0
CPU ϳ ϲ2 ϴ2 ϴ2 72 67 ϵ5 ϵ5 ϵ5 ϵ2 ϴϵ ϴ1 ϴ0 77 ϵ5 ϵ4 ϵ5 ϴϴ
Base. T. Diff CPU ϰ 15 17 15 ϳ 3ϰ 3ϰ 2ϵ 2ϵ 22 2ϱ 23 13 30 2ϵ 30 23
CPU ϱ 11 11 12 1 24 2ϴ 2ϵ 22 14 11 20 1ϴ 23 24 22 16
CPU ϲ 16 17 1ϲ 4 2ϴ 27 2ϴ 22 1ϴ 1ϴ ϵ 14 2ϴ 22 27 22
CPU ϳ 20 20 10 5 33 33 33 30 2ϳ 1ϵ 1ϴ 15 33 32 33 2ϲ
τ 20 20 1ϲ ϳ 3ϰ 3ϰ 33 30 2ϳ 2ϱ 23 1ϴ 33 32 33 2ϲ
Blackscholes Streamcluster RSA Youtube
Fig. 13: Table showing maximum operating temperature of ARM A-15 (big) CPUs for different applications along with baseline
temperature and values of Baseline Maximum Thermal Deviation (ø) for corresponding CPUs
OnDemand Performance MRPI DATE OnDemand Performance MRPI DATE OnDemand Performance MRPI DATE OnDemand Performance MRPI DATE
CPU 4 60 62 62 61 62 64 64 65 64 56 62 60 69 59 63 59
CPU 5 61 63 63 61 63 65 67 64 65 57 65 61 66 60 63 60
CPU 6 64 65 65 64 66 67 65 69 68 59 65 67 70 63 65 65
CPU 7 61 62 62 62 62 64 64 67 64 56 64 63 67 59 62 63
ω 21 20 19 8 33 31 31 25 25 30 22 21 28 35 33 25
Blackscholes Streamcluster RSA Youtube
Fig. 14: Table showing least average operating temperature of ARM A-15 (big) CPUs for different applications and values of Spatial
Maximum Thermal Deviation (ø) for corresponding CPUs
Fig. 15: Frequency of thermal cycles for different benchmarking
applications on different power and mapping schemes
whereas, a receiver is the CPU core, which is establishing the
thermal side-channel attack. In the study by Knechtel et al.
[18], referred to as 3D-IC, the researchers exploit the specifics
of material and structural properties in 3D ICs during design
time exploration, thereby decorrelating the thermal behavior
from underlying power and activity patterns.
We performed comparison based on the following criterion:
• Whether the methodology is implemented on a simu-
lator or not implemented on a real hardware platform
and it is denoted as Sim (Simulation) in this research.
• Whether the methodology is integrated through applica-
tion/software/algorithmically and it is denoted as S.Int.
(Software Integration).
• Whether the methodology is integrated through hard-
ware or by developing special integrated circuit modifi-
cations and it is denoted as H. Int. (Hardware Integra-
tion).
• Whether the methodology is able to be deployed with
ease on existing embedded platforms utilizing DVFS
enabled multi-processors and it is denoted as Easy.
• Whether the methodology affects the spatial thermal
TABLE 3: Comparative study of 3D °TASCS [16], Long et al .
[17] and 3D° IC [18] with DATE
Method Sim S.Int. H.Int. Easy STR TTR T.C.
3D°TASCS [16] 3 7 3 7 3 3 7
Long et al . [17] 3 3 7 3 7 7 7
3D° IC [18] 3 7 3 7 7 7 7
DATE 7 3 7 3 3 3 3
gradient of the processing elements actively and it is
denoted as STR (Spatial Thermal Reduction).
• Whether the methodology affects the temporal thermal
gradient of the processing elements actively and it is
denoted as TTR (Temporal Thermal Reduction).
• Whether the methodology affects the thermal cycle
frequency or thermal cycling of the processing elements
of the embedded MPSoC actively and it is denoted as
T.C. (Thermal Cycles).
Table 3 shows the outcome of the comparison, where it
could be clearly noticed that DATE is not just easy to imple-
ment but could be deployed easily on existing hardware as well
as hardware systems, utilizing DVFS enabled multi-processors,
to come in the future through algorithmic implementation
and would not just secure the system from temperature based
side-channel attack but also affect the thermal gradient of the
operating CPU cores actively, hence, affecting reliability of the
device as well. Another important observation is that because
the DATE was implemented on a real hardware platform, the
methodology provides more confidence in the research work
being pursued since simulation platform could differ from the
practical results achieved from real devices.
7 CONCLUSION
In this paper, we proposed a universal metric to quantify se-
curity of embedded devices against temperature side-channel
attacks and a novel approach, DATE, to secure DVFS enabled
MPSoCs against the same. We also performed a real thermal
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Fig. 16: Temperature peaks of 4 ARM A-15 big CPU cores while executing Blackscholes benchmark using Linux’s Ondemand and
Performance governors
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Fig. 17: Temperature peaks of 4 ARM A-15 big CPU cores while
executing Blackscholes benchmark using DATE
Fig. 18: Histograms of temperature peaks of ARM big CPUs for
Blackscholes using ondemand governor vs DATE (Frequency vs
temperature (°C))
side channel attack on Samsung Note 9 mobile device utilizing
machine learning to release the feasibility of such an attack.
Experimental studies evaluated on the Exynos 5422 MPSoC and
comparative study with the state-of-the-art proves the efficacy
of DATE in securing the device from thermal side-channel
attack. Therefore, from experimental evaluation we also proved
that DATE is not just effective against temperature side-channel
attacks but is also effective to enhance reliability in terms of the
lifespan of the device.
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